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Most studies of competition law enforcement treat competition authorities as all-knowing,
unwavering and benevolent. They do not behave opportunistically, do not face asymmetric
information and choose their actions to optimize social welfare.
In this paper, we drop one of these assumptions, and study a competition authority that can not
commit to a particular investigation strategy. As a consequence, a competition authority’s
decisions to investigate will be driven by the (ex-post) desistance effect instead of the (ex ante)
deterrence effect of an investigation policy. The resulting opportunistic behaviour may lead to a
suboptimal investigation strategy.
To analyse the interplay between investigation policies, deterrence and desistance, we study a
model in which a competition authority monitors multiple sectors and faces a budget constraint
that prevents it from deterring cartels in all sectors simultaneously. We ﬁnd that, in the absence
of commitment, developing a sector speciﬁc reward scheme based on the number of captured
cartels can improve welfare.
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Abstract in Dutch
De theoretische literatuur over het handhaven van de mededingingswet gaat er meestal vanuit dat
een mededingingsautoriteit alwetend, standvastig en welwillend is. Ze handelt niet
opportunistisch, kent geen informatieasymmetrie, en kiest haar acties om de maatschappelijke
welvaart te maximaliseren.
Dit paper laat één van deze aannames los en bestudeert een mededingingsautoriteit die zich niet
kan commiteren aan een bepaalde onderzoeksstrategie. Als gevolg hiervan laat de
mededingingsautoriteit zich bij haar onderzoeksbeslissingen leiden door het (ex post)
oppakeffect in plaats van het (ex ante) afschrikeffect van een onderzoeksstrategie. Dit
opportunistische gedrag kan leiden tot een suboptimale onderzoeksstrategie.
We bestuderen het samenspel tussen de onderzoeksstrategie, het afschrikken en het pakken van
kartels voor een mededingingsautoriteit die de mededingingswet met een beperkt budget in
meerdere sectoren tegelijk moet handhaven. We vinden dat opportunistisch gedrag leidt tot een
suboptimale allocatie van mensen en middelen. Een sectorspeciﬁek beloningssysteem voor de
mededingingsautoriteit gebaseerd op het aantal gepakte kartels kan de allocatie verbeteren.
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Competition authorities play an important role in the regulation of markets. They enforce
competition law by detecting and sanctioning anticompetitive behaviour like collusion or abuse
of dominance.
Most studies of competition law enforcement treat competition authorities as all-knowing,
unwavering and benevolent. They do not behave opportunistically, do not face asymmetric
information and choose their actions to optimize social welfare.
In this paper, we drop one of these assumptions, and study a competition authority that can
not commit to a particular investigation strategy. As a consequence, a competition authority’s
decisions to investigate will be driven by the (ex-post) desistance effect instead of the (ex ante)
deterrence effect of an investigation policy.
Deterrence arises when cartels do not form because the detection probability is too high.
Desistance results when cartels are stable, in spite of a vigilant competition authority, but are
subsequently caught after which they revert to competitive behaviour for some time. The
incentive for a competition authority to behave opportunistically arises because once an
investigative strategy has deterred enough cartels, the competition authority will want to focus
on desistance instead.
To analyse the interplay between investigation policies, deterrence and desistance, we study a
model in which a competition authority monitors multiple sectors and faces a budget constraint
that prevents it from deterring cartels in all sectors simultaneously. The absence of commitment
will then result in a suboptimal allocation of resources. We ﬁnd that, in the absence of
commitment, developing a sector speciﬁc reward scheme based on the number of captured
cartels can improve welfare.
781 Introduction
Competition authorities play an important role in the regulation of markets. They enforce
competition law by detecting and sanctioning anticompetitive behaviour like collusion or abuse
of dominance. The goal of competition law is inherently economic: making sure the market
process works effectively. This has led economists to study how policies that aim to contribute to
achieving this goal should be designed. Competition authorities are gradually discovering how
to use such studies in designing their enforcement policies. Theoretical and empirical analysis
has for example aided policymakers in the design of leniency policies by competition authorities
(Spagnolo (2000), Motta and Polo (2003) , Harrington (2005), Aubert et al. (2006) and Chen and
Rey (2007), and in the development of ﬁning guidelines (Connor and Bolotova (2006)).
In most studies of the interaction between a competition authority and ﬁrms, the former is
treated as unwavering, all-knowing and benevolent. It does not behave opportunistically, does
not face asymmetric information, and chooses its actions to optimize total welfare. This
contrasts with the economic theory of the interaction between regulators and ﬁrms. Here, the
possibility of opportunistic behaviour by regulators and asymmetric information are seen as
essential features of the regulatory environment, which determine what regulatory policies are
feasible (Laffont (1994); Armstrong and Sappington (2007)).
Some issues arising from information asymmetry have been studied in the context of
competition law. For example, Besanko and Spulber (1989) study optimal competition policies
when cartels’ production costs are private information. Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) address the
implications of imperfect competition law enforcement on the strategic behaviour of ﬁrms.
These studies generally conclude that it is socially optimal to tolerate some level of collusion, in
line with the well-known trade-off between efﬁciency and rent extraction resulting from
information asymmetry.
However, the consequences of the absence of commitment have not been studied in the
context of competition law yet. In general, the possibility of opportunistic behaviour will reduce
the effectiveness of regulator policies. For example, investments levels may be lower, in essence
because ﬁrms expect to be expropriated once investments are sunk (Besanko and Spulber (1992);
Laffont and Tirole (1992)). Designing policies that allow regulators to commit can therefore
improve welfare. In ﬁnancial markets, for example, economists argue for the independence of
central banks, because this allows them to focus credibly on keeping inﬂation low (Barro (1983);
Barro (1986); and Vickers (1986)).
The central strategic variable that a competition authority can use to inﬂuence ﬁrms’
behaviour, is its investigation strategy. By investigating a sector more or less intensively, for
example by allocating more or less resources to it or auditing it with a higher frequency, the
probability with which cartels are detected in this sector decreases or increases. In the literature
on optimal competition law enforcement, a competition policy is therefore generally deﬁned as
9the probability of detection chosen by the competition authority. An essential assumption in
most, if not all, of this literature is that a competition authority does not behave opportunistically,
and that it can stick to an announced audit strategy even if the strategy is not optimal ex post.
The crucial importance of this assumption was already noted by Besanko and Spulber
(1989), who state ’In the absence of a credible commitment to sue (...) the deterrence effects of
antitrust policy would be lost’. The consequences of the absence of commitment and potential
remedies have been investigated in the context of income tax audit policy (Graetz and Wilde
(1986), Melumad and Mookherjee (1989)) and fraud detection strategies for insurance ﬁrms
(Picard (1996)). However, little progress has been made in incorporating these ideas into a
theory of optimal competition law enforcement.
We think it is not realistic to assume that a regulator can credibly commit itself to an
investigation policy. As noted by Spulber (1989), commitments are hard to verify because it is
hard to observe how much effort the competition authority devotes to the detection and
prosecution of cartels. It may be easy to hide internal reallocations of resources from the outside
world and there is no outside agency with the coercive power to enforce the actual
implementation of a particular policy. Consequently, it is difﬁcult for the competition authority
to restrict its future actions, especially when those actions may increase social welfare ex post.
Since the consequences of opportunistic behaviour by the competition authority for competition
law enforcement may be large, we conclude that the issue warrants further investigation.
In this paper, we aim to take a small step in treating competition authorities more realistically
by assuming that a competition authority can behave opportunistically. To study the resulting
commitment problem, we analyse the interplay between detection probabilities, deterrence and
desistance. Deterrence arises when cartels do not form because the detection probability is too
high. Desistance results when cartels are stable, in spite of a vigilant competition authority, but
are subsequently caught after which they revert to competitive behaviour for some time. The
incentive for a competition authority to behave opportunistically arises because once an
investigative strategy has deterred enough cartels, the competition authority will want to focus
on desistance instead.
In reality competition authorities probably value desistance to some extent. This can be
inferred from the way in which some competition authorities (for example the Dutch
Competition Authority, NMA, and British Competition Authority, OFT) try to measure the
effect on welfare of their enforcement activities. They estimate the deadweight loss caused by
the cartels caught (assuming that these stop colluding at least for a while), but ignore the
deterrence effect.1 If taken literally, this implies a pure focus on ex post effects of enforcement.
More realistically, it suggests that competition authorities put at least some value on desistance.
1 They mention that deterrence may also exist, but ignore it because it can not be measured. This can be justiﬁed if ﬁnes
or detection probabilities are too low, for then the deterrence effects equals zero.
10It is also clear that competition authorities value deterrence. Indeed, competition authorities
sometimes publicly pre-announce their enquiries into certain sectors and publish the results. For
example, the European Commission (EC) announced the start of sector enquiries in the
electricity & gas sector and the ﬁnancial markets in 2005, whereas the Dutch and British
competition authorities (OFT) annually present their investigative priorities. The reasons cited
by competition authorities to justify these efforts are diverse: identifying restrictions of
competition, focussing investigative efforts, increasing effectiveness of competition policy and
improving knowledge of particular sectors. In essence, these arguments claim that by setting
priorities, detection probabilities are increased.
Competition authorities monitor multiple sectors and have limited budgets. The absence of
commitment will then result in a suboptimal allocation of resources. We argue that an
appropriate sector speciﬁc reward for cartels detected can improve the competition authority’s
investigative strategy. We conjecture that publicly announcing sector enquiries and publishing
their results may also be a way for competition authorities to commit themselves to a particular
policy, by making resource allocation observable.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 ﬁrst presents a simple model that captures
the commitment problem. The competition authority chooses a detection probability for a
particular industry with one potential cartel, and the cartel chooses whether or not to collude.
Since investigations are costly, from an ex post perspective the competition authority has an
incentive not to carry out its threat to investigate the sector. After that, a more realistic model is
discussed in which the competition authority has to allocate limited resources among two
sectors. In each sector many potential cartels exist, which differ in their stability. Once a the
competition authority has deterred a fraction of the cartels in both sectors, it has an incentive to
change its investigation strategy and focus on desistance, i.e., on catching cartels that have not
been deterred. We show that opportunistic behaviour can be remedied by an appropriate sector
speciﬁc reward for cartels detected. Section 3 concludes and discusses potential implications of
our ﬁndings for competition policy as well as possible expansions of our model.
11122 Commitment and desistance
This section ﬁrst describes a basic model that captures part competition authorities commitment
problem. In the second, part we drop some of the simplifying assumptions and discuss a more
elaborate model.
2.1 Basic intuition
Consider an industry consisting of identical ﬁrms which choose whether to collude (C) or to
compete (NC). Colluding ﬁrms’ proﬁts are πC > 0, while proﬁts from competition are πNC = 0.
The competition authority can ﬁght collusion by investigating the industry. An investigation
policy is denoted by β ∈ {0,1}, where β is the probability with which the cartel is caught and
ﬁned. 2 In this subsection we restrict β to take on the values 0 or 1. The detection probability
can therefore alternatively be interpreted as the decision whether or not to investigate. The per
period expected proﬁts for an individual ﬁrm from collusion are πC −βF. In this subsection, we
abstract from issues concerning the cartel’s internal stability and assume that the cartel is stable.
3 The marginal costs of realizing a detection probability β are given by the constant e > 0. After
a ﬁrm has been found guilty, it has to pay a ﬁne F, which we assume exogenously ﬁxed, for
example because it is determined by law. Let V denote the welfare gains (or prevented welfare
losses) from deterrence of the cartel. The competition authority’s objective is to maximize
welfare. We assume that PC
F < 1 andV > e.4
Suppose that the competition authority can commit to a particular investigation strategy
(detection probability). It then acts as a stackelberg leader with respect to the colluding ﬁrms.
The competition authority ﬁrst chooses a detection probability β, and after observing β the
industry decides whether or not to collude. If πC −βF > 0 the ﬁrms collude (choose strategy C)
whereas if πC −βF ≤ 0 they compete (choose strategy NC). Since investigating ﬁrms is costly,
V > e, the optimal policy for the government is to set ˜ β = 1. Therefore, if the competition
authority can commit, ( ˜ β,NC) is an equilibrium and the cartel is deterred
Assume next that the competition authority and the ﬁrms move simultaneously. One
interpretation is, that the competition authority can not commit to a particular investigation
strategy, and will ex post deviate from its strategy if that is optimal. Because starting an
2 In reality, the competition authority ﬁrst investigates and then prosecutes. We describe this by one probability. We also
abstract from the possibility of assessment errors. See Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) for an analysis of the consequences
of such errors.
3 This implies that we analyse the behaviour of an industry as a single entity. An alternative interpretation is to consider a
dominant ﬁrm in an industry which has to choose between abuse of dominance or behaving competitively. In the next
subsection we will relax this assumption.
4 The ﬁrst condition ensures that a cartel can in principle be deterred. The second condition ensures that deterring the
cartel would yield positive welfare gains.
13investigation is a costly activity, whatever the ﬁrms’ strategy, the competition authority has an
incentive to deviate from its chosen investigation policy. After all, nothing can be gained from
the investigation given the ﬁrms choice to collude or not to collude. If strategies are chosen
simultaneously, β = 0 is therefore a dominant strategy for the competition authority, and if
β = 0, then colluding is optimal for the industry. The unique Nash equilibrium is therefore
{β = 0,C} and the cartel is not deterred.
So far, we have assumed that there are no welfare gains from detecting a cartel. An
alternative assumption is that a competition authority does value desistance. Two arguments may
support this. First, if ﬁrms stop colluding for some time after detection, catching cartels
increases welfare. Second, even in the complete absence of welfare gains, competition
authorities may value catching a cartel because capturing cartels, unlike deterrence, is
observable and may be related to material rewards like a budget increase or exemption from
budget cuts and immaterial rewards like status.
LetU therefore denote the value the competition authority attaches to desistance. We assume
U > e.5 In equilibrium the cartel must now follow a mixed strategy. If the ﬁrms collude, it is
optimal for the competition authority to choose β = 1. However, if the ﬁrms compete, it is
optimal to choose β = 0. On the other hand, if the competition authority choose β = 1, it is
optimal for the ﬁrms to compete, whereas if β = 0 it is optimal for the ﬁrms to collude. Indeed,
if the competition authority values desistance, in the absence of credible commitment the unique
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is {α = πC
F ,p = e
U}, where α denotes the probability of
investigation and p denotes the probability with which the ﬁrms collude. The cartel is thus partly
deterred.
Note that the probability of colluding, p, is inversely proportional toU. An increase inU
therefore reduces the level of collusion. This suggests that the government can partially mitigate
the commitment problem by developing a reward scheme for the competition authority which
increasesU, for example based on the number of captured cartels . Note however, that ifU
becomes larger thanV, the competition authority will prefer desistance over collusion. In a
dynamic setting, this may then lead the cartel and the competition authority to collude on some
equilibrium where the competition authority and the cartel both earn positive proﬁts, and revert
to the mixed Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game forever if the competition authority deviates
from its collusive strategy. Another way to realize deterrence, may be to supply the competition
authority with a large enough budget, in this case e, followed by sufﬁciently harsh punishment if
the budget is underused, resulting in the competition authority choosing β = 1. This may
correspond closer to reality where most competition authority are provided with ﬁxed annual
budgets.
5 One may wonder whether U can be larger than V. For a welfare-maximizing competition authority U represents solely
the welfare gains from desistance. The welfare gains from deterrence will then always be larger or equal, if desistance
destabilizes cartels for some while.
14This simple model shows that the absence of commitment can in principle severely affect a
competition authority’s ability to deter cartels. It also suggests that this problem may be
remedied, by providing the competition authority with a ﬁxed budget and punishing it for
underuse. However, a competition authority monitors multiple sectors and has to allocate its
limited resources over these sectors. In the next section, we therefore construct a more
representative model of antitrust enforcement in multiple markets by a budget constrained
competition authority, to analyse the consequences of the absence of commitment for antitrust
enforcement.
2.2 The model
In this section, we consider a competition authority that is active in two sectors, denoted by
i = 1,2. Each sector consists of two identical ﬁrms competing in prices and producing
homogeneous products. The ﬁrms choose whether to collude or to compete. If the two ﬁrms
form a cartel and agree to produce the monopoly quantity, total industry proﬁts equal πM. The
proﬁts of an individual ﬁrm from charging the cartel price therefore equal πC = πM/2. If the
ﬁrms compete, Nash equilibrium prices equal marginal costs and both ﬁrms earn πN = 0. The
per period welfare loss due to the cartel equals B(πC). In each industry, the competition
authority ﬁghts collusion by investigating it. It does this by allocating a particular amount of
resources to a sector, which results in a detection probability β ∈ [0,1] with which the
competition authority ﬁnds the cartel if the ﬁrms collude. After a ﬁrm has been found guilty, it
will be sanctioned with a ﬁxed ﬁne F, which is determined by law.
Although the competition authority knows what sector the ﬁrms are in, it is uncertain about
the characteristics of the cartel in each sector. The competition authority has no information
concerning ﬁrms’ proﬁts or the quantities produced. 6 Consequently, from the viewpoint of the
competition authority the cartel proﬁt πC in sector i is distributed between [0,¥] with a
cumulative distribution function Gi(x). For a given detection probability β we deﬁne π∗(β) as
the level of cartel proﬁts below which ﬁrms compete, whereas all ﬁrms with proﬁts above π∗(β)
collude. This implies that by choosing a detection probability β the competition authority deters
all cartels with proﬁts in the range 0 < πC < π∗(β). We assume that if caught by the competition
authority, a cartel stops colluding for N periods and goes on colluding from period N+1 on,
where N is exogenous. Letting δ be the competition authority’s discount factor, the total welfare
6 Besanko and Spulber (1989) assume that the competition authority can observe the quantity produced by ﬁrms.
Because the competition authority acts as a stackelberg leader, the optimal investigation strategy is conditional on the
observed quantity produced.











where we have deﬁned h(β,N) = βδ(1−δN)/(1−δ)(1−δ +(1−δN)δβ)). This measures the
number of times a stable cartel is expected to be caught. We denoted the per period welfare gain
of deterring a cartel with cartel proﬁts by B(πC), in line with Chen and Rey (2007).7
Furthermore,V(π∗(β)) denotes the welfare gains due to cartels that are deterred as a result of
the competition authority strategy, whereas the second termU(π∗(β),β) denotes the welfare
gains due to cartels that desist from their cartel strategy for N periods. Note that the desistance
term equals zero for N = 0, i.e. if ﬁrms do not stop colluding after detection, as it should be.8
The two sectors are identical but have different cumulative distribution functions Gi(x). This
is meant to describe the notion that the stability of cartels differs between these sectors. The
competition authority has a constant, exogenous budget of resources it can allocate among the
sectors. The detection probability βi(ti) is taken to be an increasing concave function of the
amount of resources ti allocated to that sector: β0
i(ti) > 0 and β00
i (ti) ≤ 0. The competition
authority maximizes the welfare gains from desistance and deterrence given the budget. Hence,
it does not directly care about investigation costs anymore. We assume that the competition
authority is subject to a budget constraint t1+t2 ≤ T, where T is such that it cannot deter all
cartels in both sectors simultaneously. Hence, for each feasible allocation of resources over both
sectors it holds thatå
i
G(π∗(β(ti))) < 2.9
An investigation policy is deﬁned by the detection probabilities (β1,β2) ∈ [0,1]×[0,1], where
βi denotes the detection probability in industry i. The competition authority can choose a
detection probability in a given sector by appropriately allocating its resources. This will realize
7 When deterrence for one period yields beneﬁts B the welfare effect from desistance can be derived from the recurrence






8 Explicit expressions for π∗(β) and B(x) can easily be found. Assume that linear demand is given by q = a− p/b and
constant marginal costs are denoted by c. Then πC = (a−c)2/8b and B(x) = x, i.e. the per period welfare loss equals
πC. A distribution over πC follows for example from a distribution over demand parameter 1/b or over production cost c.
To derive π∗(β), note that the ﬁrms play a repeated game. In each period, either ﬁrm can cheat on the cartel agreement
by inﬁnitesimally undercutting the monopoly price charged by the other ﬁrm. The cheater then serves the entire market
and earns the monopoly proﬁt πD = πM = 2πC. We assume punishment for cheating on the cartel agreement to consist
of a grim trigger strategy: the ﬁrm reverts to the Nash equilibrium forever. The expected cartel proﬁtsVC from following




















. Assuming that a cartel that has deviated from the cartel agreement cannot be
ﬁned, the proﬁts from deviating areVD = 2πC. For a given detection probability β, the cartel is stable ifVC >VD. Thus the
cartel is stable against cheating if πC ≥ π∗(β) = βF/
 
2δ −2βδ +2βδN+1 −1

9 Note that the competition authority deters all cartels in sector i if it allocates an amount of resources tito this sector such
that G(π∗(β(ti))) = 1.





If we assume that the competition authority is able to commit to a particular investigation
strategy, i.e., to act as a stackelberg leader, it chooses the amount of resources ti allocated to
sector i, taking into account the reaction of cartels to that choice. Equilibrium allocation of
resources will therefore solve
argmax
t1,t2
[W1(π∗(β1(t1)),β1(t1))+W2(π∗(β2(t2)),β2(t2))] s.t. t1+t2 ≤ T (2.1)
However, if the competition authority can not commit to a particular strategy, it chooses the
detection probabilities β1 and β2 in sector 1 and 2 given the cartel strategies as parameterized by
π1 and π2 and optimizes only the desistance terms
U1(π1,β1(t1))+U2(π2,β2(t2)) s.t. t1+t2 ≤ T (2.2)
In the Nash equilibrium the competition authority chooses optimally given the ﬁrms strategies
and the ﬁrms choose optimally given the competition authorities strategy. The detection






Ui(πi,βi(ti)) s.t. t1+t2 ≤ 1 and πi = π∗(βi(t∗
i )) (2.3)
Proposition 1. In the absence of commitment, the Nash equilibrium is to set ti according to
equation 2.3. Welfare will therefore always be less than or equal to welfare in the case of
commitment.
This proposition follows trivially. A competition authority that can commit can always choose
the allocation if would choose in the absence of commitment. Therefore, welfare is always less
in the absence than in the presence of commitment.
We can identify three special cases when welfare with and without commitment are equal.
First, the deterrence effect may equal zero with commitment. This happens if the competition
authority cannot deter any cartel. Second, it may be optimal to focus on only one sector both
with and without commitment. This happens if collusion is much more harmful and much more
stable in one sector than in the other. Third, when both sectors are perfectly symmetric, it is
always optimal to locate half of the resources to each sector independent of the ability to commit.
As an example, assume Gi = I(x −π) to be a step function. This implies we have two
symmetric industries with one potential cartel with proﬁt πC in each industry. Assume that T is
such that the competition authority has sufﬁcient resources to deter collusion in at most one
17industry.10 Denote by β∗ the detection probability at which the ﬁrms are indifferent between
colluding and competing, and by t∗ the corresponding amount of resources.
Suppose the competition authority can credibly commit to an investigation policy. If
t∗ < T < 2t∗ andV(β(t∗))+U(β(T −t∗)) > 2U(β(1
2T)) then the best policy is to set
{βi = β∗,βj = β(T −t∗)}, with i, j = 1,2, i 6= j. Otherwise the unique best policy is to set {β1
= β(1
2E), β2 = β(1
2E)}. This follows because the competition authority can deter collusion in
only one industry (because t∗ < T < 2t∗) and prefers to do so (because
V(β(t∗))+U(β(T −t∗)) > 2U(β(1
2T))). If it chooses to deter collusion in industry i, the best
policy is {βi = β∗,βj = β(E −e(β∗))}, since any ti >t∗ does not increase deterrence in industry
i while it decreases desistance in industry j, and ti <t∗ does not deter collusion at all. If T <t∗
orV(β(t∗))+U(β(T −t∗)) < 2U(β(1
2T)) the competition authority chooses not to deter
collusion in either industry. The unique best policy is then {β1 = β(1
2E), β2 = β(1
2E)}. This
maximizes the total value of desistance because of concavity of β(t).
Suppose the competition authority can not commit to an investigation policy. In this case, the
Nash equilibrium is given by {{β1 = β(1
2E), β2 = β(1
2E)}, {C,C}}. The strategy {β1 = β(1
2E),
β2 = β(1
2E)} of the competition authority is optimal given {C, C} because of concavity of β(t)
and {C,C} is optimal given {β1 = β(1
2E), β2 = β(1
2E)} since β(1
2E) < β∗. Hence, none of the
players has an incentive to deviate from their strategies. Focussing on one sector can never be an
equilibrium ex post because this would deter the cartel and it would always be optimal to deviate
to the other sector.
It follows that if T <t∗ orV(β(t∗))+U(β(T −t∗)) < 2U(β(1
2T)), i.e., the deterrence effect
equals zero even if the competition authority can commit, the unique equilibria with and without
commitment coincide and opportunistic behaviour does not lead to a suboptimal allocation of
resources. However, ifV(β(t∗))+U(β(T −t∗)) > 2U(β(1
2T)), although the competition
authority has enough resources to deter collusion in one industry, it is not able to do so because
of the possibility to behave opportunistically.
In conclusion, if the competition authority can credibly commit to an announced investigation
policy, it can optimally deter collusion. However, because cartels, once deterred are no longer of
interest for the competition authority, it has an incentive to behave opportunistically. This leads
the competition authority to deviate from its the optimal investigation policy by optimizing its
utility from desistance. After all, ex post nothing can be gained anymore from the investigation.
Rewarding the competition authority
Now consider whether giving the competition authority an additional incentive depending on the
number of cartels caught can lead to an improvement in the competition authorities detection
strategies.
10 This assumption is also necessary for the existence of a commitment problem.
18Suppose that the competition authority receives a remuneration Ri per cartel caught in sector i.
When the detection probability in sector i equals βi, the current expected value of the reward





If a competition authority can not commit to a particular resource allocation, an ex post reward
can never induce a competition authority to deter all cartels in one industry. If all cartels are
deterred, ex post it is optimal for the competition authority to reallocate all resources to the other
industry. Suppose therefore that in the full commitment equilibrium there are some cartels left in
each industry. Consider a symmetric reward Ri = R . If R becomes very large, the competition
authority will allocate its resources so as to maximize the number of cartels caught. If Ri can be
differentiated, all resources can be drawn to either industry by making the reward for catching
cartels in that industry very large. If the allocation of resources is continuous in Ri, all value of
t ∈ (0,1) can be realized.
Proposition 2. Suppose that for any allocation of resources there are some cartels left in each
industry. By providing a reward that is differentiated per sector, the competition authority can be
induced to choose any allocation of resources. In particular, the optimal allocation can be
obtained.





Ui(πi,βi(ti))+R1N1(π1,β1(t1)) s.t. πi = π∗(βi(t∗
i )) and t1+t2 = 1 (2.4)
A sufﬁcient (but not necessary) condition for the competition authority to allocate all its
resources to sector 1, is that the value derived from received rewards outweighs the decreased
value from desistance in sector 2. This is the case if the maximum value from desistance in
sector 2 is lower than the value of rewards received when the competition authority allocates all
its resources to sector 1. That is R1N1(π∗(β1(1)),β1(1)) > maxt [U2(π∗(β2(t)),β2(t))]. Such an
R1 exists if N1(π∗(β1(1)),β1(1)) > 0, i.e., if not all cartels are deterred for t1 = 1. An analogous
argument for sector 2 holds. Therefore, both t1 = 1 and t1 = 0 can be realized. If the allocation
of resources is continuous in Ri, all allocations t1,1−t1 can be obtained, including the optimal
allocation.
19203 Conclusion
Competition authorities are usually treated as unwavering, all-knowing and benevolent. In this
paper, we view competition authorities as strategic players in a game of law enforcement and
explore the consequences for competition law enforcement if a competition authority cannot
commit to an investigation policy and has to allocate limited resources among two sectors. We
assume that resources are insufﬁcient to deter cartels in both sectors. If deterrence is realized in
one sector, the competition authority wants to reallocate resources to the other if it values
desistance in that sector. This opportunistic behaviour leads to a suboptimal allocation of
resources.
Providing an incentive to focus on speciﬁc sectors, for example by rewarding detection, can
reduce the commitment problem. This may be a rationale for given competition authorities
yearly targets in terms of a minimum number of cartels to detect. Other measures that can
potentially reduce the commitment problem include pre-announcing sector enquiries and
publishing their results. This will constrain resource allocations, because a minimum amount of
effort is required to produce results. Another possibility is the contractual outsourcing of
sectorial studies, thereby restricting possible reallocations of resources. Finally, a competition
authority might acquire external ﬁnancing for investigative efforts in certain sectors. The
external suppliers will then require resources to be allocated accordingly, again constraining
possible reallocations of resources.
Our analysis lends itself to several extensions. First, the model may be extended to describe a
situation where the competition authority can condition its detection strategy on the quantity
produced by ﬁrms. This would be in line with the work of Besanko and Spulber (1989) Second,
it would be relevant to describe a situation where ﬁrms cannot observe the detection probability
directly, but only the number of cartels caught. They then learn the actual detection probability
as time progresses. This may partially solve the commitment problem, as deterrence can then not
exist without desistance. A third extension relates to the static nature of our model. We assume
that the competition authority chooses β only once. In reality, not only the cartel plays a
repeated game, but also the competition authority can choose to reallocate its resources each
period. Extending the analysis to a dynamic setting may allow commitment to be supported by
the repeated nature of the game. Finding optimal detection strategies in this case relates to an
important line of work on mechanism design with collusion. In this literature, collusion is often
modelled in reduced form to sidestep issues of information signalling and bargaining under
asymmetric information (Laffont and Martimort (1997)). It is a challenge for future work to
explicitly model the dynamic interaction between ﬁrms and a competition authority in the
absence of commitment. Treating competition authorities as regulators but with limited tools and
applying insights from the theory of regulation will result in a more realistic theory of
competition law enforcement, produce new insights and contribute to the development of more
21effective competition policies.
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